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Abstract: Canada recognizes young people’s constitutionally protected freedom of 
expression and consequently their right to engage in a narrow subset of consensual sexually 
expressive practices without being prosecuted as child pornographers. Nevertheless, 
numerous anti-sexting campaigns decry the possibility of voluntary and “safe sexting” let 
alone the affordances of adolescents’ self-produced and consensually shared sexual 
imagery. In this article, we argue that these actors have erred in their construction of 
youths’ risqué imagery as inherently risky and thus governable. We propose that anti-sexting 
frameworks—which conflate consensual and nonconsensual sexting and which equate both 
with negative risks that purportedly outweigh the value and benefits of the practice—rely 
on a calculus that is fundamentally flawed. This article consists of two main parts. In Part I, 
we map and trouble the ways in which responses to consensual teenage sexting emphasize 
the practice’s relationship to embodied, financial, intimate and legal risks. In Part II, we 
suggest that research examining consensual adolescent sexting and young people’s rights 
to freedom of expression consider alternative theoretical frameworks, such as queer 
theories of temporality, when calculating the risk of harm of adolescent sexual imagery.  
Keywords: teenage sexting; adolescent sexuality; risk; queer time; queer temporalities; 
freedom of expression 
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1. Introduction 
The criminalization of consensual teenage sexting—defined here as the creation and distribution of 
nude, semi-nude and sexually explicit imagery via digital means—is now well documented in the US 
and Australia 1. Conversely, since the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Sharpe in 2001, Canada has 
recognized young people’s right to engage in a narrow subset of consensual sexually expressive 
practices without being subject to child pornography prosecution [4] 2. In Sharpe, the Court was faced 
with a constitutional challenge to the criminalization of the possession of child pornography set out in 
s. 163.1(4) of the Canadian Criminal Code [5], the purpose of which is to protect children from 
exploitation and abuse by prohibiting possession of material that presents a “reasoned risk of harm to 
children” [4]. When considering the dual concerns of protecting children and protecting free 
expression, Chief Justice McLachlin, writing on behalf of the majority, found that prohibition against 
possession of child pornography “captures in its sweep materials that arguably pose little or no risk to 
children, and that deeply implicate the freedom [of expression] guaranteed under s. 2(b)” ([4], para. 105) 3. 
Thus, to remedy the law’s over breadth the court upheld the law’s constitutionality but determined that 
it must not be applied to two categories of material—minors’ “self-created, privately held expressive 
materials” and minors’ “private recordings that do not depict unlawful sexual activity” ([4], para. 99) 4. 
																																																								
1  Teenagers for the purposes of this article are those between the ages of 13 and 17. This age group is also referred to as 
adolescents, teens and minors throughout the article. Recent studies of arrest trends for child pornography possession 
and production in the US have found that child pornography possession and production arrests grew significantly 
between 2000 and 2006 and again in 2009 [1,2], and that a large segment of the population being criminalized were 
minors. Twenty-three percent of people arrested for child pornography production in 2009 were 17-years-old or 
younger ([2], p. 2). Approximately one-third, or 134, of these young people created these images ‘in the context of 
romantic relationships or for sexual attention-seeking’ ([2], p. 2). According to another US study of arrests, of the cases 
involving ‘youth-produced sexual images’ that constituted child pornography in 2008 and 2009, 33 percent were 
classifiable as ‘experimental’ or those which ‘did not involve adults or appear to include any intent to harm or reckless 
misuse’ ([3], p. 3). Nevertheless, ‘in 18% of the experimental cases, in which there was no other criminal or malicious 
activity beyond the making or transmission of images, there was an arrest’ ([3], p. 6) meaning that 47 youth who 
consensually ‘sexted’ for ‘romantic’, ‘attention seeking’ or ‘other’ purposes were subject to criminal prosecutions. 
2 The Court in R. v. Sharpe sites section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which reads as follows: 
“everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion, and expression, including 
freedom of the press and other media of communication.” A discussion of the facts and the decision reached in R. v. 
Sharpe is discussed below.   
3 Chief Justice McLachlin goes on to write: The legislation prohibits a person from articulating thoughts in writing or 
visual images, even if the result is intended only for his or her own eyes. It further prohibits a teenager from possessing, 
again exclusively for personal use, sexually explicit photographs or videotapes of him- or herself alone or engaged with 
a partner in lawful sexual activity. The inclusion of these peripheral materials in the law’s prohibition trenches heavily 
on freedom of expression while adding little to the protection the law provides children. To this extent, the law cannot 
be considered proportionate in its effects, and the infringement of s. 2(b) contemplated by the legislation is not 
demonstrably justifiable under s. 1. ([4], para. 110). 
4 The private use exemption is subject to a number of very significant and mandatory limitation and prerequisites, most 
notably, for our purposes partnered monogamy and the requirement that: 
(c) the recording must be kept in strict privacy by the person in possession, and intended exclusively for the private use 
by the creator and the persons depicted therein ([4], para 116). 
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Indeed, the court went so far as to acknowledge that such imagery may be “of significance to 
adolescent self-fulfillment, self-actualization and sexual exploration and identity” ([4], para. 109). As 
such, as long as youth consensually create and exchange sexual imagery with other minors with whom 
they are in an intimate and non-exploitative relationship, for their personal and private mutual 
enjoyment, such imagery ought to be constitutionally protected. 
Despite the existence of this exemption, present day social, political, and extra/legal debates 
surrounding teenage sexting in Canada tend not to acknowledge the constitutionality of this subset of 
teenagers’ consensual sexual expression 5 . Although we have yet to witness the prosecution of 
teenagers for scenarios that fall within the exemption’s parameters, or for consensual distribution that 
falls outside of these parameters, we have seen the development of numerous anti-sexting campaigns 
by police and child protection agencies which decry the very possibility of consensual and ‘safe 
sexting’, let alone the affordances of the practice as acknowledged by the Supreme Court [9,10]. In this 
article, we argue against the construction of youths’ ‘risqué imagery’ as inherently risky and thus 
potentially subject to legal censure 6 . We suggest that young people’s consensually created and 
																																																								
5 William Eskridge argues that the meaning of sexual consent has changed over time and in response to women’s and 
queers’ increased power ([6], p. 48). Consent is not a simple volitional category but rather is inherently concerned with 
legal status and social policy ([6], p. 55). That is, the recognition of a valid choice cannot be separated from the status 
of the chooser(s) and the chosen (55). The legal meaning of the same act may differ depending on one’s status as a 
minor or an adult. However, as Eskridge notes, “status and consent are both conceptions serving a larger cultural 
script… [which is] socially regulatory” ([6], p. 55). Childhood is a culturally specific social construct. There are limits 
to relying on one’s status as a “child” to deny their ability to consent to sexual relations and expression. In making this 
argument we do not deny that there very well may be important difference between a 13 year old and a 25 year old 
sexter, especially when we take into account gender, sexual orientation, race, class and other intersecting forms of 
power and oppression, however, blanket understandings of vulnerability based on age does not always accurately 
account for young people’s assessment of their experiences [7]. We share with Angelides a concern about adults’ 
willingness to accept uncritically an adolescent subjectivity that claims to have been harmed and victimized, but not 
accept an adolescent subjectivity that claims desire, autonomy, and consent [8]. Given that one’s agency is always 
partial and constrained by internalized norms and structural constraints (for both adults and young people), in this 
article we start from the position that consensual teenage sexting ought to be acknowledge as a valid expressive choice 
notwithstanding our complex cultural context. 
6  Ideas about the inherent riskiness of teenage sexting are likely an extension of the Court’s finding in R. v. Sharpe [4]. In 
it the Court was faced with a constitutional challenge to the criminalization of the possession of child pornography as 
set out in s. 163.1(4) of the Canadian Criminal Code, the purpose of which is to protect children from exploitation and 
abuse by prohibiting possession of material that presents a reasoned risk of harm to children. With respect to the harms 
of child pornography the court wrote: 
The very existence of child pornography, as it is defined by s. 163.1(1) of the Criminal Code, is inherently 
harmful to children and to society. This harm exists independently of dissemination or any risk of 
dissemination and flows directly from the existence of the pornographic representations, which on their own 
violate the dignity and equality rights of children. The harm of child pornography is inherent because 
degrading, dehumanizing, and objectifying depictions of children, by their very existence, undermine the 
Charter rights of children and other members of society. Child pornography eroticises the inferior social, 
economic, and sexual status of children. It preys on preexisting inequalities ([4], para. 158) (Emphasis added). 
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distributed sexual imagery, including their distribution of imagery to those whom they are not in an 
intimate relationship with, poses little risk to children. We suggest that this warrants a reconsideration 
of Canadian crime prevention practices which, in essence, render the constitutionality of consensually 
self-produced and shared sexual imagery moot 7. Recognizing that the adjective risqué derives from 
the French risquer, literally meaning ‘to risk’ 8, we nevertheless start from the position that “Nothing is 
a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on 
how one analyses the danger, considers the event” ([17], p. 199). We propose that extant frameworks, 
which conflate consensual and nonconsensual sexting and which equate both with negative risks that 
purportedly outweigh the value and benefits of the practice, rely on a calculus that is fundamentally 
flawed. As Dean notes, “[r]isk is a way—or rather, a set of different ways—of ordering reality, of 
rendering it into calculable form. It is a way of representing events so that they may be made 
governable in particular ways, with particular techniques, and for particular goals. It is a component of 
diverse forms of calculative rationality for governing the conduct of individuals, collectives and 
populations” ([18], p. 25).  
This article consists of two main parts. In Part I, we map and trouble the way in which academic, 
police, and child protection responses to consensual teenage sexting emphasize the practice’s 
relationship to embodied risks (including mental, physical and sexual health and bodily integrity), 
financial risks (including ‘future prospects’), intimate risks (such as sexual assault and ruined 
reputation), and legal risks (including criminalization of minors and their parents) 9. In Part II we assert 
that the risk regimes documented in the previous section act as a proxy for moralizing and thus 
governing youth sexuality [9,20–22], and suggest that any research examining sexting’s risks ought to 
consider additional and alternative variables and theoretical frameworks 10. In an effort to reconsider 
and resist the risk based moral regulation of adolescent sexual expression we reframe consensual 
																																																																																																																																																																																													
However, as is discussed at a later point in the article, this claim is undermined by the creation of the 
existence of the private use exemption as well as other extant defenses to the law, such as artistic merit. It is 
this contradiction that largely drives this article’s analysis.  
7  Indeed, risqué—which is defined by the Oxford dictionary as “slightly indecent and liable to shock, especially by being 
sexually suggestive” [11]—is a commonly used adjective by media when describing teenage sexting [12–14]. 
8  As derived from a compilation of sources, including: The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language [15] 
and the Encyclopedias of Academic Dictionaries [16].   
9  Of course these distinctions bleed into, are therefore are somewhat falsely distinguished from, one another. Another 
classification of risk is advanced by Ringrose and Barajas who suggest that literature examining adolescent sexuality 
online has tended to focus on what they call “outside-unknown” dimensions of minimal sexual risks such as high profile 
criminal phenomena such as pedophilia. In contrast they “seek to expand [and complicate] an understanding of 
gendered and sexual risk into the everyday relations in the young people’s immediate, inside-known realm of  
peer-to-peer relations in their social networks both online and offline” ([19], p. 125) (Emphasis in original). 
10  In making this claim we are not proposing an alternative formula or analysis that guarantees a reliable and quantifiable 
yield. As Hunt writes, “holding out such a promise…all too often functions as a form of normative judgment” ([20],  
p. 175). Nevertheless, given that Canadian obscenity case law has largely conflated notions of risk and harm and denied 
the need to demonstrate harms (such as the risk of harm posed to women by pornography as advanced in R. v. Butler 
[1992]) and given that some form of normative judgment is reproduced in law we offer a line of reasoning that ought to 
be considered by legal actors who are responding to this practice. 
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teenage sexting through queer theorizations of temporality and futurity, in particular Judith 
Halberstam’s theorization of “queer time” and risk [23,24].  
2. Constructing Teenage Sexting as Risqué/Risky 
Canadian policing and child protection agencies have emphasized the risks of sexting since 2005 
when Cybertip.ca—Canada’s national tipline for reporting the online sexual exploitation of children—
issued a public alert about “the growing trend of young girls posing nude for webcams and the 
distribution of the resulting photos and videos on the Internet” [10,25]. Subsequently, provincial and 
federal policing units across Canada released warnings about the myriad risks that sexting poses for 
both teens and their parents. One such warning issued by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 
in 2011 claims:  
From a legal perspective, each photo may be constituted as child pornography and 
individuals can be charged with Possession of Child Pornography as defined by the 
Criminal Code of Canada. Further, a person sending a photo or video, even of themselves, 
can be charged with Distributing Child Pornography. In some instances, parents will be at 
risk of Criminal charges if their child’s phone is in their name [26]. 
While the legal risks of sexting have loomed large in media and crime control coverage as well as 
academic responses to the practice since 2008 11, also present in these warnings are references to the 
intimate and financial risks that sexting may pose to minors’, and particularly to girls’, reputations and 
future prospects [10,27]. Notably, despite the fact that the legal rationale for criminalizing child 
pornography rests on fears about the risk of sexual exploitation, this fear plays a very minor role in 
anti-sexting PSAs and warnings 12. For instance, a notice released by the Ontario Provincial Police’s 
Child Sexual Exploitation Unit titled “Warning for Teens on Dangers of Irresponsible Texting”, 
claims: “teens need to become aware that …[sexting is a] risky activity [that] has very real dangers 
associated with it that includes many unintended consequences and permanent long term threats to 
their identity and reputations” [30] 13. This caution is repeated in an undated “Message from your 
Local RCMP” which reads: “minimum sentences for child pornography offences can be jail time. But 
what carries a longer sentence is how your actions online can follow you for a lifetime” [32]. Here and 
elsewhere, the RCMP suggests that sexters will inevitably lose control of their sexual images which 
will then make their way onto the internet thus affecting teens’ chances to obtain higher education and 
employment given that: “post-secondary institutions and employers often use the internet to help with 
the hiring or acceptance” [26]. While this claim is not completely unfounded [33], a survey of  
college-bound students conducted by Kaplan found that more than three-quarters of respondents said 
																																																								
11  See Hasinoff for a brief history of the sexting panic that emerged after early incidents of teenage sexting that occurred 
in the US were discussed as legal curiosities because teenagers were charged with producing child pornography ([27],  
p. 133). See also Bailey and Hanna [28] and Slane [29] for discussions of the some of the issues with a criminal law 
response and alternatives to it. 
12  See Hasinoff for a discussion of the shift in the on-line danger rhetoric from the late 1990s onwards [27].  
13  Kath Albury et al. in their analysis of Megan’s Story argue, “Young girls are ‘supposed’ to preserve their ‘reputations’ 
by avoiding overt demonstrations of sexual knowingness and desire” ([31], p. 465). 
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they would not be concerned if a college admissions officer Googled them [33]. Part of this confidence 
had to do with youths’ increased online savviness and their attention to “strengthening privacy settings 
and circumventing searches [as demonstrated by the fact that] 22% had changed their searchable 
names on social media, 26% had untagged themselves from photos, and 12% had deleted their social 
media profiles altogether.” The study also acknowledged that such online searches might in fact be 
beneficial for youth if they “turn up postings of sports scores, awards, public performances or news of 
something interesting they’ve undertaken” [33] 14.  
In addition to police issued warnings, a growing number of quantitative studies continue to focus 
their attention on sexting’s prevalence and its correlates to embodied sexual risk behaviours [34]. Most 
popular among the empirical work in this area are studies examining the links between sexting and 
‘high-risk sexual behaviours’ such as having multiple partners, having ‘friends with benefits’, 
performing and receiving oral sex, using alcohol and drugs while having sex, and engaging in 
unprotected sex [35–39]. For example, the study by Huock et al. discovered that sexting was 
associated with same-sex sexual behaviours, and those who “sexted endorsed more intentions than 
their peers to have sex in the next 6 months, suggesting that targeted interventions with this group are 
warranted” ([35], p. 5). This study further emphasizes that “attention should be paid to adolescents’ 
electronic communication because sexting may be a marker for sexual risk behaviours that can have 
significant consequences, including pregnancy or disease” ([35], p. 6). Results such as these, however, 
ought to be scrutinized for a variety of reasons. To begin with, unprotected sex and sex combined with 
excessive alcohol and drug use ought to be of concern for youth, and adults, regardless of whether a 
relationship to digital technology exists. Nevertheless, neither the sheer number of sexual partners one 
has, nor the nature of the sexual relations that one engages in (straight/queer) is inherently harmful. An 
individual who has 10 sexual partners with whom they consistently and correctly use condoms has an 
exceedingly low risk of contracting an STI compared to an individual who has sex with only one 
person and does not use a condom [40]. Similarly, to equate queer sexuality with increased risk of harm 
relies on assumptions about the diseased and contaminating nature of that orientation and the sexual acts 
being engaged in. Heterosexuals, for instance, also practice anal sex in high numbers, whereas not all 
gay men do. Moreover, as Klettke and co-authors note in their systematic review of the literature 
regarding sexting’s prevalence rates, risks, and protective factors, researchers ought to be wary of 
drawing causal relationship between sexting and risky behaviours ([34], p. 51). For example, individual 
studies may be methodologically flawed if they fail to consider the possibility and relevance of a third 
variable (such as a lack of progressive sexual education) that could explain the correlation between 
certain practices. As an example, while the long-term trend of declining teen pregnancy rates in 
Canada appears to have come to an end, at least for the moment, claiming that this rise is caused by 
increased sexting behaviours would ignore solid evidence that suggests “teenage girls are more likely 
to get pregnant when they have fewer education or employment opportunities to postpone  
child-bearing for” [41]. Indeed, even those sexual health experts who have drawn correlations between 
economics and pregnancy are quick to note that myriad factors may also be at play [41]. 
																																																								
14  Indeed additional efforts by teens to control the meaning, if not the content, of their digital footprints is discussed at a 
later point in the article. 
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A greater acknowledgement of the fact that correlation does not necessarily imply causation is of 
particular importance in light of claims that directly link sexting to the development of mental health 
issues and suicide [42]. Much of the media attention generated with respect to sexting flows from the 
incredibly sad but exceedingly rare stories about sexting-related suicides, such as that of Jesse Logan 
in 2009 in the US and Amanda Todd in 2013 in Canada [43]. These exceptional stories exemplify, and 
are an extension of, what Cassell and Cramer argue are historically recurring moments of anxiety 
about the dangers of girls’ use of new communication technologies [44]. Nevertheless, the Canadian 
Royal Mounted Police in its anti-sexting warning to minors and their parents caution that “these acts 
have been linked to suicides” [26]. Similar warnings have been issued by provincial police forces. The 
Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) warns teens that officers are “increasingly seeing more teens that are 
unable to cope with the self-inflicted personal shame and embarrassment that they have unknowingly 
created” (emphasis added) [30] 15. These warnings explicitly and implicitly perpetuate the widely held 
belief that a direct and uncomplicated link exists between sexting and fatal consequences. More 
recently, however, a large-scale study found no correlations between sexting and sexual risk behaviors 
or psychological health [45]. Increasingly the media has highlighted the results of emerging studies 
which suggest that “the cause-and-effect link made by the media, politicians and parents between 
persistent bullying and the victim’s decision to end their life…oversimplifies teen suicide and 
cyberbullying at the expense of recognizing the complex set of mental health issues that are usually at 
play in many cases” [46,47]. 
While these collective risks have generated a great deal of concern as well as institutional  
responses [9,27,31], legislators and the courts have historically framed the key risks of child 
pornography as its facilitation of child sexual abuse. Thus, to the extent that youths’ self-created and 
distributed digital sexual imagery may technically be classified as “self-produced child pornography”, 
youthful sexters have been constructed as a menace not only to themselves but also their peers [48]. 
The harms of child pornography, as constructed by the Supreme Court of Canada, include the risk that 
“explicit sexual photographs and videotapes of children may promote cognitive distortions, fuel 
fantasies that incite offenders, enable grooming of victims” ([5], para. 103). Censorship is thus 
advanced as a key means of preventing child sexual abuse [5,48]. In addition, the Court in R. v. Sharpe 
claimed that:  
[C]hild pornography creates a risk of harm that flows from the possibility of its 
dissemination. If disseminated, child pornography involving real people immediately 
violates the privacy rights of those depicted, causing them additional humiliation. While 
attitudinal harm is not dependent on dissemination, the risk that pornographic representations 
may be disseminated creates a heightened risk of attitudinal harm ([5], para. 164). 
Thus, the legal risks of sexting, noted above, flow from the claim that teens ought to be held 
criminally responsible for the potential risk of harms that their images may facilitate at some unknown 
point in the future. Critics of this line of argumentation note that the causal relationship between such 
imagery, attitudes and acts is generally unsupported by the evidence which “tends to be ‘soft’, diffuse 
																																																								
15  For a discussion of the responsibilization the teenage creators of sexual imagery, rather than those who redistribute their 
imagery without their consent, for the harms that may flow to them see Karaian [10].  
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and hardly conclusive” ([49], p. 102) and that it is unjust to make youth who create sexual expression 
responsible for a secondary offense, such as their potential sexual abuse and the abuse of their peers, at 
some point in the future.  
Central to legal analyses of the possession and distribution of “self-produced child pornography” 
are questions about how one ought to understand the practice and calculate the extent to which it poses 
a realistic and reasonable risk of harm to minors that necessitates the infringement of their expressive 
rights. A common rejoinder to those who seek such an infringement is to reference legislator’s original 
intentions when drafting child pornography laws, specifically the fact that they were never intended to 
police the expressive acts of youth. Another response is to highlight that youth who engage in this 
practice rarely have either the intent or the power to exploit themselves and their peers 16. While these 
are important interventions, we suggest that any assessment of the “reasoned risks” of sexting also 
requires legislators and courts to reconsider how the risks of sexting are given meaning and made real, 
as well as the value and affordances that may flow from the practice 17. 
3. Calculated Risk and the Role of Queer Time  
The escalation of risk discourses has given rise to calculative approaches for determining 
uncertainty, danger, and responsibility (such as statistics, actuarial tables and epidemiology), despite 
the fact that risk is a contested concept subject to debate about its nature, causes, effects and 
management. While some risk theorists suggests that “it has become almost nonsensical to associate 
‘risk’ with a positive outcome or to use it in a positive manner” ([52], p. 110, referencing [53,54]), 
other socio-cultural, socio-legal and queer perspectives have highlighted the complex and dynamic 
processes involved in understanding and assessing risk’s negative effects and its affordances [20,23,55]. 
These theorists often speak to the different valuations of risk as both potentially negative and positive, 
and as interwoven in processes of identity formation and group constitution [55].  
In this context, some have sought to draw attention to the limits of “interpreting activities and 
identities solely through the reductive lens of measuring risky behavior found in neo-liberal, audit 
culture” ([19], p. 123). Ringrose and Barajas, for instance, have noted the ways in which opportunity 
appears to be set in opposition to risk, “as its positive, healthy, safe, exploratory counterpoint” ([19], 
pp. 122–23). They suggest, however, that we “need to trouble the risk framework and exceed the 
risk/opportunity binary, since…activities can be both risky and opportunistic at the same time” ([19], 
																																																								
16  That said, a growing and related anti-sexting discourse has developed in the Canadian context which constructs all 
forms of sexting, consensual or otherwise as self/peer-exploitation. For a critical consideration of the structural integrity 
and effects of such a move see Karaian [50]. 
17  For example, the notion of attitudinal or communicative harm, as Calder and Beaman note, is a vestige of the claims 
regarding the communicative and social harms of pornography stemming from dominance feminists’ arguments in R. v. 
Butler (1991) wherein the Supreme Court of Canada accepted the argument that pornography deemed obscene might 
give rise to ‘social harm’ of a form cognizable by the criminal law, thus producing, according to Calder and Beaman, a 
“legal recognition as real of something whose metaphysical status was deeply contested—a certain form of harm [that 
has long buoyed the criminal law]” ([51], p. 79). 
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pp. 122–23) 18. This is particularly necessary, they claim, given a postfeminist media culture within 
which “gender relations are more messy and complex than rational agents doing risk aversion vis-à-vis 
risky or healthy options” ([19], p. 123) 19.  
We agree that young people’s online sexual practices may be simultaneously risky and 
opportunistic, and that any attempt to calculate the effects of this consensual practice will be impacted 
by the social context within which the practice is experienced and by the social characteristics of those 
involved ([52], p. 124). We also acknowledge that girls, and particularly privileged ‘good’ girls whose 
‘protection’ has largely driven the call to keep teens safe from sexting’s harms [9,10,27] may be 
navigating the “risky implication of the postfeminist porno-chic discourses of sexual performance”, as 
Ringrose and Barajas suggest ([19], p. 134). Nevertheless, given the use of risk discourses as a proxy 
for moralizing and thus governing youths’ sexual behavior, we contend that alternatives to hegemonic 
legal and post-feminist sexualization frameworks ought to be considered in any analysis of sexting’s 
risks [9,20,22]. This is necessitated, in part, by what Alan Hunt argues is a significant shift in the way 
in which moral regulation functions.  
In the nineteenth century ‘the moral’ was a distinctive genre; things were condemned as 
‘wrong’ or ‘immoral’. Increasingly, morality has come to function through proxies, not in 
its own voice, but in and through other discursive forms, the two most important and 
closely related being the discourses of ‘harm’ and ‘risk’…The moral dimension is not 
excluded, rather it becomes subsumed within discourses whose characteristics have a 
utilitarian guise ([20], pp. 166–67).  
This hybridization of moralization and risk, according to Hunt, works to blur “the boundary 
between objective hazards and normative judgments” ([20], p. 167). Such a blurring lies at the heart of 
the legal and extra-legal policing of teenage sexting witnessed across North America [9,10,50]. For 
instance, this is evidenced in the US Court of Appeal decision Miller v. Mitchell [2010] [57]—the first 
American case to challenge the constitutionality of prosecuting teens for sexting—wherein the court 
found: “[A]n individual District Attorney may not coerce parents into permitting him to impose on 
their children his ideas of morality and gender roles…While it may have been constitutionally 
permissible for the District Attorney to offer this education voluntarily (that is, free of consequences 
for not attending [the criminal diversion program]), he was not free to coerce attendance by threatening 
prosecution” (as cited in [9], p. 62). The role of moralization in anti-sexting efforts is also outlined by 
Karaian in her analysis of Canadian child protection/crime prevention efforts wherein she illustrates 
the central role that sexual respectability plays in internet safety campaigns which emphasize 
																																																								
18  Risk scholars have also argued that we must recognize the “importance of ‘risk and pleasure’ as a counter discourse, 
especially risk taking, which Featherstone (1995) and Lupton (1999) recognize can be a means to transcend the 
mundane nature of everyday life” ([52], p. 124). 
19  They define post-feminism as “a discourse where feminist recognition of sexism is vehemently rejected or viewed as 
obsolete leaving a space for intensified stereotypes of femininity and masculinity to thrive” ([19], p. 123). See also, 
Salter and colleagues who suggest that portrayals of teenage sexuality which reinforce teen girls as “agentic, 
knowledgeable, [and] savvy” reproduce a simplistic victimization/empowerment dualism “that does not account for the 
participation of teenage girls in the self-production of media such as sexts and ignores the complexity of young people’s 
engagement with new technology in a cultural environment characterized by significant gender disparities” ([56], p. 304). 
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abstinence and responsibilize white, middle-class, heterosexual, able-bodied teenage girls for the 
prevention of sexting’s purported harms [10]. Such efforts, she suggests, go some distance to 
demonstrating “adults’ fear[s] [that] ‘good’ girls will not only be (dis)graced, but that raced and 
classed boundaries will be blurred, marring [their daughters] as ‘white trash’—immodest, immoderate 
and subject to under/un-employment, thus simultaneously devaluing the moral authority of the white, 
middle-class, heterosexual family in the process” ([10], p. 291; see also [21]). 
In his analysis of the relationship between the rise of risk discourses and moral regulation Hunt 
suggests that our world is not necessarily safer or more secure, rather, it is transected by dimensions of 
security and danger. That is, safety and danger stand in some non-linear relation to security, anxiety 
and fear and discourses of risk “play a significant part in how risks are experienced and lived” ([20],  
p. 168). The non-linearity of this dialectic informs much of the work of continental philosophers’, and 
more recently queer theorists’, analyses of time, space and sexuality ([58], p. 138) 20. Within the last 
decade, a body of queer theorists have argued that contemporary politics of normalization are anchored 
in a particular normative temporal disposition. Winnubst writes that dominant social norms, including 
heteronormativity, capitalism, patriarchy, whiteness, nationalism, religion, and even homonormativity 
are “energized by and grounded in a temporality that orients us always and only towards the future” 
and that our “unwitting obedience to the future” renders us docile ([58], p. 138). Given the seeming 
naturalness of our relationship with time, however, temporality is not often interrogated, nor do we 
interrogate its “power over our lives and the norms that we unconsciously enact” ([58], pp. 138–39). 
Queer theorists have sought to do just this and in doing so have raised important questions for any 
analysis of the risks of adolescent sexual expression. 
“Queer time”, according to Judith Halberstam, is a different mode of temporality that arises out of 
an immersion in queer sex subcultures which develop in opposition to the institutions of family, 
heterosexuality, reproduction and “kinship-based notions of community” ([24], pp. 313, 328).  
Queer time for me is the dark nightclub, the perverse turn away from the narrative 
coherence of adolescence—early adulthood—marriage—reproduction—child rearing—
retirement—death, the embrace of late childhood in place of early adulthood or immaturity 
in place of responsibility. It is a theory of queerness as a way of being in the world and a 
critique of the careful social scripts that usher even the most queer among us through major 
markers of individual development and into normativity (as cited in [59], p. 182). 
Halberstam’s notion of queer time is elsewhere described as a model of temporality which 
“disassociate[s] from the hierarchical dyadic construction of ‘risk/safety’” ([60], p. 258). As such, 
Ummni Khan has used this queer temporal framework to argue against the legal regulation of consensual 
																																																								
20  Winnubst’s sets out some of the distinctions between continental philosophy’s and queer theory’s engagement with 
time. According to Winnubst, “Several different philosophical quarters have influenced this work on temporality: 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, Husserlian phenomenology, Bataillean general economy, Foucaultian genealogy and, recently, 
a Deleuzian kind of relationality and becoming. But queer theorists have also taken up the dynamics of temporality as they 
emerge out of different cultural, political, and literary archives—i.e., out of historical and contemporary resources, 
ranging from ethnographies and interviews to film and popular culture that are common to the interdisciplinary 
scholarship in cultural studies, but not to scholarship in philosophy—and these subsequently inform the kinds of 
theoretical elaborations at work in various strands of this debate within contemporary queer theory” ([58], p. 138). 
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sadomasochistic sexual relations on the grounds that it “fails to acknowledge that some people may 
have a sexual bent that creates an entirely different relationship to risk and desire” ([60], p. 258). In her 
analysis of R. v. J.A—a Canadian case which considered the issue of consent within an s/m context 
involving “edgeplay”—activities that are considered extreme or risky—Khan argues that “timing was 
the linchpin” to the Supreme Court’s finding that one could not give prior consent to sexual acts 
experienced while being unconscious as a result of erotic asphyxiation ([60], p. 258). Despite the 
messy facts of the case and the good intentions of the Court, Kahn suggests that the Supreme Court’s 
finding that consent requires a ‘contemporaneous and conscious mind’ reinforces a normative sexual 
agenda, one which perpetuates what Halberstam refers to as a hegemonic, gendered and sexualized 
construction of time and space [23]. Kahn argues that the risks of erotic asphyxiation considered by the 
court—such as the risk that the conscious lover may misinterpret the desires of the unconscious party 
or that they may purposefully exceed the boundaries of her consent—fail to consider how the person 
rendered unconscious, “find such a risk irrelevant, or even exciting” ([60], p. 258). Centering the 
practice of “risk-aware consensual kink” or RACK, Kahn notes how some members of the s/m 
community not only assert their “right to engage in activities considered more ‘extreme’ but also [to] 
challenge [] the binary opposition between ‘safety’ and ‘risk’”, thus “foregrounding the fact that all 
sexual activity—including vanilla sex—carries some risk” ([60], p. 259). Khan claims: 
If we thus take into account the challenges offered by queer theory and the RACK 
approach to s/m, it become apparent that the process of deciding which risks and desires 
will be considered unacceptable, and which will be ignored or naturalized, depends on 
sexual ideology that privileges vanilla risk aversion over non-normative desire—whether 
or not there is a claim or evidence of non-consent ([60], p. 259).  
Ultimately, Khan concludes that the majority decision in R. v. J.A. “imposes a sexual normativity 
that disregards kinky understandings of acceptable or even desirable risk in queer time, where 
sensation and satisfaction can happen out of sequence. In their place, the context of domestic violence 
and sexual danger becomes the master narrative for interpreting erotic asphyxiation” ([60], pp. 259–60). 
To the extent that consensual teenage sexting has been constructed by mainstream culture and law 
as on the margins of normative sexual relations and expressive practices and as a threat to young 
peoples’ future selves, we suggest that it can be reframed as enacting a “nonnormative logics and 
organization of community, sexual identity, embodiment and activity in space and time” ([23], p. 6) 
and that the implications of this beg further consideration. We raise the framework of queer time and 
the example of R. v. J.A., as dissimilar as it may first seem to the issue at hand, in order to highlight the 
limitations of contemporary theorizations of, and responses to, sexting’s risks. Given that young 
people, according to Green and colleagues, “are constantly engaged in risk assessment, actively 
creating and defining hierarchies premised upon different discourses of risk as ‘normal’ and acceptable 
or ‘dangerous’ and out of control” ([52], pp. 123–24) the master narrative/sexual ideology and linear 
notions of time and space that frame determinations of ‘childhood’ and ‘risk’, require further 
consideration. Ultimately, we suggest that it is necessary to consider whether youth have a different 
relationship to risk and to reframe how we determine whether that relationship is “reasonable”. 
By way of example, it is useful to consider fears about the risk of privacy violations and the police 
issued imperative that youth maintain control of their image at all times. How are we to understand this 
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risk when, as boyd argues in her analysis of ‘networked privacy’, “[a]ny model of privacy that focuses 
on the control of information will fail” and “achieving true control is nearly impossible because control 
presumes many things that are often untenable” ([61], p. 349)? How might adults’ emphasis on the 
need for young people to limit access to their self-produced content fail to understand or acknowledge 
adolescents’ resistance strategies in a context of ‘networked privacy’? For instance, boyd writes:  
Many of the teenagers I have interviewed have given up on controlling access to content… 
Rather than trying to limit access to content, they work to limit access to meaning. They 
use pronouns and in-jokes, cultural references and implicit links to unmediated events to 
share encoded messages that are for all intents and purposes wholly inaccessible to 
outsiders... Only those who are in the know have the necessary information to look for and 
interpret the information provided ([61], p. 349) (Emphasis added). 
To answer questions about the risks of privacy violations, boyd asserts that privacy needs to be 
understood in context. However, which ‘context’ gets privileged in this meaning making process 
matters significantly. As we have already noted, sexting’s risk and opportunities have largely been 
framed as a byproduct of the media’s sexualisation of girls and women. As Hasinoff notes, this master 
narrative relies on normative assumptions about healthy sexuality and often erases girls’ capacity for 
choice [27]. Queer frameworks offer alternative contexts for understanding this practice, particularly 
with respect to the role that risqué expressive practices may play in the development of one’s identity, 
community and sexual subjectivity. Indeed queer theories of temporality may help make sense of a 
newly released study by MediaSmarts on Sexuality and Romantic Relationships in the Digital Age 
which found that “while the risks caused by sexts that are forwarded or shared with other recipients are 
obvious…approximately three quarters of students who send sexts have never had one forwarded by 
the recipient” ([62], p. 24) 21 . A recent systematic review of the literature regarding sexting’s 
prevalence rates, risks, and protective factors, similarly found that despite knowledge of the potential 
risks of sexting, such as the unintended distribution of one’s sext to a third party, across most of the 
studies, “attitudes to sexting were more positive amongst those who had previously engaged in sexting 
behavior” ([34], p. 45) 22. Indeed a growing body of research suggests that, on average, engaging in 
sexting does not produce subsequent negative attitudes towards the behavior ([34], p. 51) despite 
knowledge that one’s image may be redistributed, presumably because negative consequences do not 
inherently flow from the behaviour.  
There are a few different insights that can be taken away from these findings. The first, and most 
obvious, if not the most popular message, is that youth appear to demonstrate quite a reasonable 
respect for their peer’s privacy, despite media claims that would state otherwise. While it likely remains 
“necessary to exercise caution before concluding that trust serves as an antidote to risk” ([20], p. 170) 
these studies, at the very least, begin to trouble the claim that one’s image will inevitably be 
redistributed and thus the prominent classification of consensual sexting a “public safety risk” and a 
																																																								
21  The study also finds that “Although one-quarter of creators report that a sext they have sent was forwarded by the 
intended recipient, only 15 percent of students who have received a sext created from them report that they forwarded 
the sext to someone” ([62], p. 24). 
22  Klettke and co-authors reviewed 31 sexting studies (out of a total of 128 articles which met their original inclusion  
criteria) ([34], p. 45). 
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“real criminal risk” [30]. However, these findings also allow us to consider the less popular possibility 
that, as is the case in ‘risk-aware consensual kink’, the pleasure of the practice may to some degree 
flow from knowing that the boundaries of their consent may be exceeded. If this is the case, the effects 
of such a breach cannot be solely be understood as negative or in binaristic safety/risk terms. This 
reading challenges risk theory’s construction of risk as bad, something to be avoided and instead 
recognizes “the positive face of risk as excitement and pleasure” ([20], p. 177) and even self-actualization.  
This returns us to a discussion of the relevance of ‘risk-aware consensual kink’ and queer 
temporalities. That is, any analysis of teenage sexting’s risks would benefit from a consideration of not 
only the pleasures and affordances of risk—for one’s identity construction, development of community 
and sexual subjectivity—but also how the practice may not fully conform to any causal and linear 
mode of calculation. For instance, if we understand consensual sexting as enacted in a context of 
‘networked privacy’, any calculation of sexting’s risks would need to acknowledge the blurred 
boundaries of the variables to be considered. If we acknowledge that the “boundaries [between the 
private and the public, or between the individual and the aggregate] aren’t so coherently defined and 
[that]… entities aren’t so easily articulated” ([61], p. 348), we can better acknowledge what Lupton 
and Tulloch have identified as a sense of risk as being shared [63–65]. Indeed, the risks of sexting are 
often framed as the possibility that one’s parents or grandparents may see their imagery, thus 
implicating the family in their risk taking and the shame that it may bring to them all ([10], p. 296). In 
this sense, we understand ‘shared risk’ as spread over more than one body/self. As such, it represents a 
blurring of identity, which is not recognized by the major tenets of the ‘risk society’ and its 
representation of the atomized risk-avoiding individual ([64], p. 324). This ‘shared risk’ provides 
opportunities for understanding how rewarding the payoff of such risk taking may be to the ‘risk taker’.  
Boyd extends this line of thinking we she decides to use new technologies to reveal the secrets of 
her DNA. As a result of this DNA testing she claims that she not only revealed data about herself and 
her family, she also: 
gave away data that provides insights into my mother, brother, grandparents, and even 
children that I don’t yet have. I never asked my future grandchildren for permission to 
offer their data to a scientific database. I made a decision about the privacy of my data that 
affects numerous people who are implicated but who have no say. And, in doing so, I 
learned information about them that they may not wish to know, let alone have me  
know ([61], p. 348). 
Boyd’s example reveals for us the future moment in the present action in such a way that the 
linearity of time is queered. This, we argue, invokes Halberstam’s notion of “queer temporalities” and 
its implications for consent in ways that do not necessarily disqualify her actions in the present.  
Queer theorizations of time also offer an important opportunity to reconsider adolescent sexters as a 
subculture with a different relationship to time and risk. As noted above, “queer subcultures”, 
according to Halberstam, “produce alternative temporalities by allowing their participants to believe 
that their futures can be imagined according to logics that lie outside of those pragmatic markers of life 
experience—namely birth, marriage, reproduction and death” ([23], p. 2). According to Halberstam, a 
theorization of queer subculture poses an important challenge to the notion of the subculture as a youth 
formation. While this allows for an expanded definition of subculture “beyond its most banal 
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significations of youth in crisis”, it also presents an opportunity to “challenge our notion of adulthood as 
reproductive maturity” ([24], p. 321). While youth who consensually sext constitute a broad and 
diverse category of individuals [34,66] and thus would not likely be considered a “queer subculture” in 
the way that Halberstam is using the term 23, they nevertheless invoke Halberstam’s call for us to 
“rethink the adult/youth binary in relation to an ‘epistemology of youth’ that disrupts conventional 
accounts of youth culture, adulthood and maturity” ([23], p. 2). This disruption is further necessitated 
by a consideration of adult sexters. As has been demonstrated in part I of this article, teenage sexting, 
shores up threats to the natural and normative progression of teens’ future selves as untarnished, 
economically self-sufficient, free (from imprisonment), and most important of all, alive. Whereas 
concerns about boys’ safety revolve around certain, privileged boys’ bright futures and the risks posed 
to their futures should they be imprisoned as distributors of child pornography, concerns about girls’ 
futures involve predictions of mentally and sexually damaged young women, or women with ruined 
reputations and hence circumscribed opportunities for higher education, employment, and although it 
is never explicitly stated, the opportunities to snag a mate in those spaces [9,10,21]. These fears about 
teens’, and in particular certain girls’ futures, are reliant on a heteronormative, gendered and raced and 
classed “logic of reproductive temporality” ([23], p. 4). However, while they revere the construction of 
the universalized, rational, and respectable “normal” neo-liberal sexual subject who is capable of 
making responsible decisions in their own interest, they conveniently disregard that the fact that the 
‘future’ adult sexual subject who they set out to protect can, and does, in our current time and space, 
engage in the practice with equal regularity to adolescents and indeed accesses sexting tips from any 
number of mainstream print and online sources 24.  
Finally, we would like to suggest that a queer theoretical framework introduces the possibility that 
hyperbolic responses to the risks of consensual teenage sexting may have increased its allure as a 
desirable and pleasurable practice, to be seized and embraced. That is, rather than frame young 
people’s decisions to sext as lacking in awareness of the practice’s risks and its future consequences, 
queer theories of time reframe the threat of a “constantly diminishing future” in such a way that young 
people can be understood as “creat[ing] a new emphasis on the here, the present, the now, and while 
																																																								
23  Halberstam argues that “Queer subcultures produce alternative temporalities by allowing their participants to believe 
that their futures can be imagined according to logics that lie outside of those paradigmatic markers of life experience—
namely birth, marriage, reproduction, and death” ([23], p. 2). Later in the text, Halberstam calls for “an understanding 
of subcultural life as a place of collectivity rather than membership” ([23], p. 179). 
24  YourTango, a popular site that provides expert advice about love, sex, dating and relationships, provided a list of 8 Do’s 
and Don’ts of Sexting. The list is as follows: 
(1) Don’t sext to soon— it is important get to know the person first and determine whether you can trust them 
(2) Don’t sext before having live sex—you don’t want to kill the curiosity as well as over deliver or under deliver the  
real thing 
(3) Do be a tease—look at it as foreplay; flirt and build up anticipation 
(4) Do mirror your partners mood—you want to ensure reciprocal interaction 
(5) Don’t be a selfish sexter—ensure both parties are comfortable and equally satisfied with the level of participation 
(6) Do focus on details—by being descriptive you can increase anticipation and maintain engagement 
(7) Don’t drink and sext—to prevent any unwanted sexting make sure you are sober 
(8) Don’t use sexting as a substitute for real thing—“Make sure to create a healthy balance between the different types 
of sex you have and keep the passion and excitement going” [67]. 
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the threat of no future hovers overhead like a storm cloud, the urgency of being also expands the 
potential of the moment and…squeezes new possibilities out of the time at hand” ([23], p. 2).  
4. Conclusions 
In this article we have argued that a rethinking of the risk/safety binary is necessary given its role in 
precluding youths’ expressive rights and even subjecting them to criminal prosecution in ways that 
adults are not. To date, relatively little scholarship about consensual teenage sexting grapples with the 
affordances of teenage sexual expression explicitly referenced by the Supreme Court of Canada in its 
Sharpe decision. While the desire to do so exists, at least on our part, for the purposes of this article we 
have sought to consider how knowledges about risk are mediated through social and cultural 
frameworks and discourses and what alternative frameworks might offer to this analysis. In this way, 
we acknowledge that these knowledges are dynamic and historical. Part of the history of the extra/legal 
construction of, and response to, the risks of teenage sexting is undoubtedly Canada’s strong anti-porn 
legacy and its current rearticulating in fears about childhood sexualization, both of which infantilize 
adolescents and women and fail to theorize the pleasures of sexuality and its expression alongside its 
possible dangers [27,68]. As such, we suggest future work in this area consider whether, and to what 
extent, the risks of consensual sexting can be understood as affording teens “a means of extending the 
self” or as a means of “seeking and meeting challenges and gaining knowledge of one’s self and the 
world” ([64], p. 328).  
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